Keynote Address: The Continuing Problem of Too Big to Fail by Johnson, Simon
NORTH CAROLINA
BANKING INSTITUTE
Volume 18 | Issue 1 Article 3
2013
Keynote Address: The Continuing Problem of Too
Big to Fail
Simon Johnson
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/ncbi
Part of the Banking and Finance Law Commons
This Comments is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North
Carolina Banking Institute by an authorized administrator of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
law_repository@unc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Simon Johnson, Keynote Address: The Continuing Problem of Too Big to Fail, 18 N.C. Banking Inst. 1 (2013).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/ncbi/vol18/iss1/3
KEYNOTE ADDRESS: THE CONTINUING
PROBLEM OF "TOO BIG TO FAIL"
BY SIMON JOHNSON*
Simon Johnson discusses the shortcomings of the Federal Re-
serve System's policy leading up to the 2007-2008 financial crisis, par-
ticularly regarding big banks. He addresses the repercussions of re-
garding big banks as "too big to fail" and "too big to jail." Johnson
analyzes the arguments supporting limited regulation of big banks, in-
cluding (1) whether there are economies of scale and scope justifying
the size of megabanks and (2) the role that subsidies play in banks' as-
sumption of risk. Johnson argues that the Federal Reserve System must
engage in the debate regarding the financial regulation of big banks in
order to prevent future financial crises.
In November 2002 Ben Bernanke, who was then a Governor of
the Federal Reserve System, not yet the Chairman, spoke at a confer-
ence at the University of Chicago that commemorated the ninetieth
birthday of Milton Freidman. Mr. Bemanke said, "I would like to say to
Milton and Anna: Regarding the Great Depression. You're right, we did
it. We're very sorry. But thanks to you, we won't do it again."' So that
was an apology, an official apology, from the Federal Reserve about
seventy years after some huge policy mistakes, misunderstandings, and
misapprehension about what the U.S. economy and the world economy
had become.
The question I put before you for consideration now and today
and tomorrow is: how long will it be until the Federal Reserve apolo-
gizes for its more recent policies? How much will that do for us? Can
we push perhaps, not for an earlier apology-I think that given the way
politics and regulation work an apology is unlikely, but can we push for
a meaningful shift in Federal Reserve policy? I think that is the issue of
* Simon Johnson is the Ronald A. Kurtz Professor of Entrepreneurship, Massachusetts Insti-
tute of Technology, Sloan School of Management.
1. Ben S. Bernanke, Governor, Bd.of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Remarks at
the Conference to Honor Milton Friedman at the University of Chicago (Nov. 8, 2002),
available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/BOARDDOCS/SPEECHES/2002/20021108/.
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the moment and of the year-the policy of the Federal Reserve towards
financial regulation.
Now, in case you think I'm being unfair in singling out the Fed-
eral Reserve, let me just make a couple of supportive points. First, this
is the centennial of the Federal Reserve. 2 The Federal Reserve has pre-
sided over three major economic disasters since it was created. Its re-
sponsibility in the Great Depression of the 1930s is not controversial -
this point is agreed to by Ben Bernanke. 3 The 1970s is not my topic to-
day, but the failure of monetary policy in the United States was pro-
found and fortunately Paul Volcker brought us back from the brink.4
And regulatory policy failed a third time, dramatically in the run-up to
2007-2008, and it fails us today.
Let me focus on the run-up to 2007-2008 crisis.
What was the Federal Reserve responsible for in the early to
mid-2000s? Consumer protection is one area. The Federal Reserve's
performance was a complete disaster. I also do not think anyone would
say they did well in that dimension of their financial stability work. And
part of the result is the absence of full employment-not now, not for
the last five years, and not anytime soon. How about price stability?
That is a fascinating question, and the jury is still out on that one. It is
not clear to me that they came at all close to hitting their objectives on
any of these targets.
What is the outcome of the Dodd-Frank financial reform pro-
cess?5 Of course some of those pieces are still coming into place, but
what can we see quite clearly from that legislation and from its imple-
mentation? Has the power and the authority of the Federal Reserve in
the light of its disastrous record increased or decreased?
The Federal Reserve has absolutely become more powerful.
Yes, there are some other players in the mix around financial regulation.
There is now a Financial Stability Oversight Council chaired by the
2. The Federal Reserve Act of 1913 created the Federal Reserve System on Decem-
ber 23, 1913. For more information regarding the centennial of the Federal Reserve System,
see Planning for the Centennial, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS. (Aug. 2,
2013), http://www.federalreserve.gov/aboutthefed/centennial/about.htm.
3. Bernanke, supra note 1.
4. Paul Volcker was Chairman of the Federal Reserve under Presidents Jimmy Carter
and Ronald Reagan, from 1979 to 1987.
5. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act),
Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of the U.S.
Code).
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Secretary of the Treasury, 6 but the Federal Reserve is the custodian of
the thinking, of the beliefs, and of the ideology that governs how the fi-
nancial system is treated.
In my book with James Kwak, 13 Bankers, we provide a lot of
nuanced history.7 There are many footnotes. All this context and texture
is important, but I think at the end of the day you have to blame some-
one. We blame Alan Greenspan.8
Alan Greenspan's thinking is at the heart of what went wrong.
The idea that you can do nothing at all about asset bubbles, let them run
their course, and clean up afterwards; this was Greenspan's idea.9 Doing
nothing about asset bubbles is a completely mistaken, dangerous be-
lief.10 It has been exploded. You do not hear it in the speeches of Feder-
al Reserve officials today, and you will not hear it again for a very long
time and for good reason. That was Greenspan's ideology.I'
What is the problem now? What is the issue? Where do we need
leadership from the Federal Reserve? I think it is very simple and very
straightforward. It is the problem of the banks-the financial institu-
tions-that are collectively referred to as "too big to fail."
I wrote in a column recently that these banks were "too big to
jail."l 2 My editor said, "Are you sure you meant jail, I thought it was
fail?" I replied that it is all of the above.
There is a PBS documentary, The Untouchables, which re-
viewed why criminal and civil cases have not been brought against ex-
ecutives of the financial institutions that were at the heart of the disaster
and at the heart of the many inappropriate things that happened subse-
quently, including the way foreclosures were handled. 13 Lanny Breuer,
who headed the Criminal Division at the Department of Justice and
6. Dodd-Frank Act, 12 U.S.C. § 5321 (2012).
7. SIMON JOHNSON & JAMES KWAK, 13 BANKERS: THE WALL STREET TAKEOVER AND
THE NEXT FINANCIAL MELTDOWN (2011).
8. Id. at 207 (noting that Greenspan "believed that government regulation was ren-
dered largely unnecessary by the free market").
9. Id. at 147 (this policy was "true to the conclusion of Greenspan's 1996 'irrational
exuberance' speech").
10. See GEORGE COOPER, THE ORIGIN OF FINANCIAL CRISES: CENTRAL BANKS, CREDIT
BUBBLES AND THE EFFICIENT MARKET FALLACY (2008).
I1. Johnson & Kwak, supra note 7, at 147.
12. Simon Johnson, Too Big to Jail, PROJECT SYNDICATE (Feb. 22, 2012),
http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/too-big-to-jail.
13. The Untouchables (PBS Frontline television broadcast Jan. 22, 2013), available at
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/untouchables/.
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whose resignation was announced after this interview,14 said on camera
that he and his colleagues did not bring criminal cases against very large
financial institutions-there's an interesting question whether this also
extends to executives who run those institutions-because it would
jeopardize financial stability.15 He also said that he consults with ex-
perts on whether financial instability would be induced by bringing
criminal charges.' 6
That raises a very interesting constitutional, regulatory question.
Who are the experts with whom the DOJ consults? Is there a list? What
are the criteria? Is this something that is applied uniformly across all po-
tential cases, or perhaps something that is more improvised according to
the circumstances? On these questions I am paraphrasing an articulate
and pointed letter sent by Senator Sherrod Brown and Senator Grassley
to the DOJ. '7 Mr. Breuer has asserted that certain financial institutions,
because of their economic and financial role, are immune from a partic-
ular form of prosecution - despite the fact that suchprosecutions are a
very important disincentive pushing against corporate misbehavior.'8 if
there are no criminal penalties, you can only face civil penalties. Civil
penalties, in this context, are generally trivial. It is a small amount of
shareholder cash that the executives are asked to hand over.
So the problem is "too big to jail," but the essence of this issue
is that certain financial institutions have a scale, a scope, a function, and
a role that is regarded as so important that they cannot be allowed to
fail. They cannot be allowed to go through bankruptcy in the way other
American corporations go through it.
At the present time there is a lot of pushback trying to defend
14. Sarah Childress, Report: DOJ Criminal Chief Lanny Breuer Stepping Down, PBS
FRONTLINE, Jan. 23, 2013, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/business-economy-
financial-crisis/untouchables/report-doj-criminal-chief-lanny-breuer-stepping-down/.
15. The Untouchables, supra note 13.
16. Id. ("But in any given case, I think I and prosecutors around the country, being
responsible, should speak to regulators, should speak to experts, because if I bring a case
against institution A, and as a result of bringing that case, there's some huge economic ef-
fect-if it creates a ripple effect so that suddenly, counterparties and other financial institu-
tions or other companies that had nothing to do with this are affected badly-it's a factor we
need to know and understand").
17. Press Release, U.S. Sens. Sherrod Brown & Chuck Grassley, Sens. Brown, Grass-
ley Press Justice Department on "Too Big to Jail" (Jan. 29, 2013), available at
http://www.brown.senate.gov/newsroom/press/release/sens-brown-grassley-press-justice-
department-on-too-big-to-jail.
18. The Untouchables, supra note 13.
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the big banks. James Kwak wrote a post on our blog, Baseline Scenario,
saying that he was surprised that the idea of breaking up the big
banks-making them smaller, for example by subjecting them to a hard
size cap-keeps being discussed.' 9 This idea came into play briefly in
2010 and was taken up by Senator Sherrod Brown and Senator Ted
Kaufman. They proposed an amendment to what became the Dodd-
Frank financial reform legislation. 20 This amendment was defeated on
the floor of the Senate, 61-33.21 That seemed like it was the end, but this
issue keeps coming back. I think this issue remains current is the con-
tinued use of power by and for this sector.
If you want a vivid example that spans all of this, think about
LIBOR. Neil Barofsky wrote a piece in the Financial Times explaining
the links between the LIBOR scandal and what he calls the "Geithner
doctrine." 22 The Geithner doctrine is the application of the idea that
since some institutions are "too big to fail" they must get all the support
we can provide.23 It feeds directly into this "too big to jail" doctrine that
was articulated on tape in an extraordinary moment by Lanny Breuer.24
The banks are naturally pushing back. Robert Rubin-former
Secretary of the Treasury, the former head of Citigroup, a longtime sup-
porter of President Obama before he became president, and the founder
of a project at Brookings called the Hamilton Project-appeared on
CNBC on February 7, 2013, arguing: the big banks are not a problem,
don't worry about them, and don't try to break them up because that
will just make things worse.25 There is a firm in Washington called
19. James Kwak, If the Fed Knows Banks Are Too Big, Why Doesn't It Make Them
Smaller?, THE BASELINE SCENARIO BLOG (May 14, 2013),
http://baselinescenario.com/2013/05/14/i f-the-fed-knows-banks-are-too-big-why-doesnt-it-
make-them-smaller/.
20. Brown-Kaufman Amendment, S. Amdt. No. 3733, 111th Cong. (2nd Sess. 2010),
available at
http://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_calllists/rollcall-vote cfm.cfm?congress= Ill
&session=2&vote=00 136) (showing the results of the roll call vote).).
21. Id.
22. Neil Barofsky, Comment, The Geithner Doctrine Lives on in the Libor Scandal,
FIN. TIMES (USA EDITION 1), Feb. 8, 2013, at 7.
23. Id. (According to Barofsky, "The 'Geithner doctrine' made the preservation of the
largest banks, no matter the consequences, a top priority of the US government." Barofsky
cites blogger Yves Smith as the creator of the phrase "Geithner doctrine.")
24. The Untouchables,supra note 13.
25. Robert Rubin on 'Too Big to Fail' Risk (CNBC Squawk Box television broadcast
Feb. 7, 2013), available at http://video.cnbc.com/gallery/?video=3000146493.
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Hamilton Place Strategies. 26 It is mostly, but not entirely, run by senior
Republican communications professionals. They issued a report in Feb-
ruary 2013 saying the same things as Mr. Rubin. 27 So, Mr. Rubin, a
Democrat with the Hamilton Project is aligned closely with the Hamil-
ton Place Strategies coming from the Republican side. I have read Al-
exander Hamilton closely and I've studied his work. I do not think he
was on board with the idea of crony capitalism. Perhaps we should say
we are looking for a Jeffersonian moment or a James Madison mo-
ment-a pushback against what are claimed to be the Hamilton ideals.
People who are aiming to protect the big banks make it sound
very complicated. They have a lot of a lot of things you should consider.
But I don't think it's actually that complicated.
Are there economies of scale and scope in banking that justify
the current size of these banks? You often hear Jamie Dimon, the head
of JP Morgan Chase, say that JP Morgan must be at its current size-
slightly over 2 trillion dollars total balance sheet-otherwise very bad
things would happen to the world economy. 28
Dennis Kelleher from Better Markets points out that if it's the
case that JP Morgan Chase must really at this scale that, then they must
have been in big trouble in early 2008 before they acquired Bear
Steams-because they were only about a $1.4 trillion bank at that point.
More broadly, where are the big gains in efficiency from a so-
cial point of view from this increase in banking scale that we have seen
in the United States over the past twenty years? The six largest banks in
the United States today have a combined balance sheet of over sixty
percent of GDP. Those same banks back in the mid-1990s were around
fifteen percent of GDP. Goldman Sachs was one of the best regarded
investments banks in the world in 1998. It had a balance sheet of about
$250 billion, or about $280-290 billion in today's money. When it came
26. HAMILTON PLACE STRATEGIES, http://www.hamiltonplacestrategies.com/news (last
visited July 18, 2013).
27. PATRICK SIMs, HAMILTON PLACE STRATEGIES, BANKING ON OUR FUTURE: THE
VALUE OF BIG BANKS IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY (Feb.2013), available at
www.hamiltonplacestrategies.com/news/big-bank-debate-continues..
28. See Steve Schaefer, JP Morgan's Jamie Dimon: Here's Why Banks Should Be So
Big, FORBES MARKETS, Aug. 13, 2012, available at
http://www.forbes.com/sites/steveschaefer/2012/08/13/jpmorgans-jamie-dimon-heres-why-
banks-should-be-so-big/; see also Stephen Gandel, Jamie Dimon: JPMorgan Is Still Too
Small, CNN MONEY, Feb. 28, 2012, available at
http://finance.fortune.cnn.com/2012/02/28/dimon-jpmorgan-bigger/.
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very close to failing-it was rescued by being allowed to become a
bank holding company-in September 2008, it was a $1.1 trillion
bank.29
Show me the economies of scale or scope, the social benefit
from those increases that we have seen over the past twenty years. I'm
not suggesting we all go back to community banking-and that is not
what Sherrod Brown's Safe Banking Act proposes. 30 This legislation
suggests we put in a cap that would affect primarily those six largest in-
stitutions and roll back their size to where they were roughly speaking
in the mid-1990s. 3 1
The Bank of England view is that when you measure it properly
and take out and adjust for the subsidies that the megabanks receive,
there are no economies of scale and scope. 32 Now, up to $100 billion
total assets, perhaps there are some economies of scale, but not above
that level. And none of the proposals on the table would push the banks
back down to that level. They would substantially reduce bank size and
the risk that any one institution can pose to the system. But they would
not take them back down to $100 billion.
The key point in what I just said is the subsidies. What are the
subsidies in banking? For a long time I have been banging the table with
a book by Anat Admati and Martin Hellwig, The Bankers' New
Clothes: What's Wrong with Banking and What to Do About It.33 I first
started to pound the table with Anat's blog post. 34 That did not make a
29. Simon Johnson, Goldman Sachs Concedes Existence of Too Big to Fail, HUFFPOST
BUSINESS "THE BLOG" (June 17, 2013, 10:47 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/simon-
johnson/goldman-sachs-concedes-ex_b_3453972.html.
30. Brown-Kaufman Amendment, S.Amdt. 3733, 111th Cong. (2nd Sess. 2010).
31. Press Release, Sen. Sherrod Brown, Brown Introduces Bill to End "Too Big to
Fail" Policies, Prevent Mega-Banks from Putting our Economy at Risk (May 9, 2012),
available at http://www.brown.senate.gov/newsroom/press/release/brown-introduces-biIl-
to-end-too-big-to-fail-policies-prevent-mega-banks-from-putting-our-economy-at-risk.
32. Andrew G. Haldane, Exec. Dir., Fin. Stability & Member of the Fin. Pol'y Comm.,
On Being the Right Size, Speech at the Institute of Economic Affairs' 22nd Annual Series,
The 2012 Beesley Lectures at the Institute of Directors, Pall Mall 12-13 (Oct. 25, 2012),
available at
http://bankofengland.co.uk/publications/documents/speeches/2012/speech6I5.pdf.
33. ANAT ADMATI & MARTIN HELLWIG, THE BANKERS' NEW CLOTHES: WHAT'S
WRONG WITH BANKING AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT (2013).
34. Anat Admati, What Jamie Dimon Won't Tell You: His Big Bank Would Be Dan-
gerously Leveraged, THE BASELINE SCENARIO BLOG (Dec. 4, 2010),
http://baselinescenario.com/2010/12/04/what-jamie-dimon-wonE2%80%99t-tell-you-his-
big-bank-would-be-dangerously-leveraged/.
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lot of noise. Then she came out with a ninety-page paper. 35 Now, I can
bang the table with this book launched in February 2013 at the Peterson
Institute for International Economics. 36
The endorsements on this book are amazing and impressive.
The one that strikes me every time I look at it is from Mervin King,
Governor of the Bank of England. The Bank of England, by the way, is
not generally known as a hotbed of radical, leftwing thought. "At last,"
Mervin King says, "[t]wo eminent economists explain in plain English
what is wrong with banks and what needs to be done to make them saf-
er." 37 There is also a great quote from Frank Partnoy, another confer-
ence participant.38
The subsidy is easy to think about. The subsidy, by the way, is
denied completely by the bankers. That is why you have to buy and read
the book. The Federal Reserve is supposed to have the smartest, deep-
est-thinking people, economists, and lawyers. They are supposed to be
the experts on this. They have not even engaged, to my knowledge, with
Anat Admati. I am shocked by the lack of willingness of the Federal
Reserve System to engage with the ideas.
The ideas are simple. If you are too big to fail, meaning that if
you get into trouble there will be some protection provided-perhaps by
the Treasury, perhaps by the Federal Reserve, perhaps by some other
officials to be named later. Remember the creativity of the government
in its various forms in the fall of 2008 when they were convinced that
the failure of Goldman Sachs or Citigroup would cause massive de-
struction around the world? Do not deceive yourselves, the fact that
Dodd-Frank places constraints on the ability of the Fed, the fact that it
modifies the emergency powers, the fact that it changes other parts of
the legal powers and authorities around the financial system does not
mean that there cannot be and will not be another bailout.39
35. Anat R. Admati et al., Fallacies, Irrelevant Facts, and Myths in the Discussion of
Capital Regulation: Why Bank Equity Is Not Expensive (Rock Ctr. for Corp. Governance at
Stanford Univ., Working Paper No. 86, Stanford Grad. Sch. of Bus. Research Paper No.
2065, 2013).
36. Book Release Meeting for The Bankers' New Clothes: What's Wrong with Banking
and What to Do About It, THE PETERSON INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS (Feb.
I1, 2013), http://www.iie.com/events/eventdetail.cfm?EventlD=262.
37. THE BANKERS' NEW CLOTHES, WHAT'S WRONG WiTH BANKING AND WHAT TO Do
ABOUT IT, http://bankersnewclothes.com/ (last visited July 18, 2013).
38. Id.
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Now if Art Wilmarth offers you the ability to go to Las Vegas
and gamble where Art will cover your losses, but you get to keep the
upside, how much risk are going to take on that trip to Las Vegas? Well,
you can take Frank Partnoy with you; he's a world expert on risk and
the history of risk and he can advise you. But I think the advice would
be, "take as much risk as you can."
In the context of capital, which is the correct focus of Anat and
Martin's book, how much capital do you want to have if you're a big
bank with a "too big to fail" guarantee? You want to have as little as
possible. Bankers will always be paid on return on equity, which is not
properly adjusted for risk and risk taking. So you want to take a lot of
risk. You hope that you get lucky a couple of years in a row. You can
get a large amount of compensation out of that.
Caps on compensation in the financial sector, I'm afraid, will
not prove effective. You get massive upside benefits and you have
downside protection when it goes bad. When it goes wrong, that's
someone else's problem. That is the essence of the incentive problem
around banking. This problem is manifested to a greater degree when
the banks are bigger, when the individual banks or a small group of
banks have more political power, it is even worse.
JP Morgan Chase is the world's largest bank, but it is not the
world's largest bank in the tables that you see presented by the banking
industry because those numbers are wrong. Those numbers show them
in the middle of the pack of the top ten and are based on comparing U.S.
GAAP (for US banks) and IFRS (for most international banks). But
these are two fundamentally different accounting standards. 4 0 I do not
understand the point of comparing apples and oranges in that way. I
don't know why leading news agencies continue to do that, except that
they are told that's the way to compare it by the banking industry.
The right way to make the comparison, in my view, is to com-
pare on the basis of IFRS which does not allow for the generous netting
of derivatives that you have under U.S. GAAP. It is a better measure of
systemic risk in my view and in the view of the IMF, people I have
40. GAAP stands for Generally Accepted Accounting Principles. IFRS stands for In-
ternational Financial Reporting Standards. The American Institute of CPAs (AICPA) pub-
lished a primer in 2011 regarding IFRS, which highlights differences between GAAP and
IFRS. See AICPA, INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL REPORTING STANDARDS (IFRS): AN AICPA
BACKGROUNDER 8 (2011), available at http://www.ifrs.com/pdf/IFRSUpdateV8.pdf
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talked to at the FDIC, and other places. If you convert JP Morgan's ac-
counts to that basis, it's not a $2.1, $2.2 trillion bank, it is a $3.9 or $4.0
trillion bank-by far, the world's largest bank. 4 1 Now, this is a $16 tril-
lion economy. Some people like to say the European banks are bigger
relative to their economies than JP Morgan Chase is relative to our
economy, but I would suggest that's a complete non sequitur. If the Eu-
ropeans want to pursue some crazy, insane policies promoting "too big
to fail" banks with massive, distorted incentives and blow themselves
up, why would we ever want to follow anything like that? You should
evaluate the risk of JP Morgan Chase on the basis of the American
economy.
The Clearing House ran a simulation of a bank failure, resolu-
tion scenario-which I think is deeply flawed and I would caution you
against putting too much faith in the results-but I understand one of
the results they had was not fail to on a Tuesday, because it is too long
from Tuesday to the weekend when the FDIC normally closes banks.
So imagine it is Thursday and JP Morgan Chase is failing. You
are advising the Treasury, the White House, FDIC, take your pick. Con-
gress and you are told that JP Morgan could fail causing massive dis-
ruption to all the derivative markets in which it is so very active. The
interlinkages across economies are mind-boggling. One of the claims
made by the friends of the big banks comes from the Financial Services
Roundtable and other people. They like to say Dodd-Frank solved the
problem of "too big to fail." There is no need to have the GAO or any-
one else investigate the "too big to fail" subsidy. This is very strange
logic. They say Dodd-Frank solved the problem because there is a new
resolution authority granted to the FDIC to deal with the failure of non-
bank financial institutions and bank holding companies. 42
This is a sensible authority. I support the granting of it. But JP
Morgan Chase operates in a hundred or so countries, if it fails there is
no cross-border resolution authority and there never will be one. And if
there was one frankly, would the French, would you trust them? Will
other governments tie their hands by agreeing ex ante on how assets and
liabilities are going to be handled and who will bear the cost of the in-
41. James R. Barth & Apanard (Penny) Prabba, Breaking (Banks) Up is Hard to Do:
New Perspective on 'Too Big to Fail' 8 MILKEN INSTITUTE (Feb. 2013),
http://www.milkeninstitute.org/pdflBreakingBanks.pdf
42. Dodd-Frank Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 5381-94 (2012).
10 [Vol. 18
KEYNOTE ADDRESS
solvency? Of course not. Everyone wants to figure it out for themselves.
If you were an official in Korea, and I've talked to the Korean officials
about this, would you trust the U.S. Treasury, or the IMF, or the FDIC
to handle the failure of say Citigroup across borders in a way that would
be protective of Korean interests? Of course not. You'd be crazy to trust
them. The Koreans will preserve their freedom of actions. So will eve-
ryone else. I say this with all due respect to Paul Tucker from the Bank
of England, who has appeared in the United States quite a bit recently,
talking about the need for and aspirations of cooperation between the
Bank of England and the FDIC on this issue. 43 It is a great aspiration,
but it is not going to happen. Resolution for cross-border, global, mega-
banks is an illusion.
There are the living wills required by Title I of Dodd-Frank.4 4 In
the living wills the banks have to explain how to handle them in a bank-
ruptcy. Bill Dudley, who is a former Goldman Sachs executive and cur-
rent President of the New York Fed, said in a speech in November 2012
that the living wills have not worked, that they have not revealed to the
regulators and supervisors how to handle the failure of these banks in a
way that would not be disruptive. 45 When the New York Fed tells you
something that is critical of Wall Street, write it in your diary. It is not
going to happen again anytime soon. So, the living wills are meaning-
less. They will never be effective. Resolution authority is not cross-
border. JP Morgan is $4 trillion dollar bank, what are you going to do?
Who would let JP Morgan Chase fail with losses to the credi-
tors, unknown with regard to the geographic impact, all of your corpo-
rate contacts are screaming about the situation-and all of the people
you know in and around finance are saying you must save JP Morgan
Chase, what are you going to do? Who would let JP Morgan Chase fail
or even attempt to go through this completely unknown, unproven black
box of resolution? Who would let JP Morgan Chase fail? They are "too
big to fail." They do not have enough capital. They will never have
43. See Paul Tucker & Martin Gruenberg, Global Banks Need Global Solutions When
They Fail, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 10, 2012,
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/speeches/2012/speech625.pdf.
44. Dodd-Frank Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 5381-94 (2012).
45. William C. Dudley, President, Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., Solving the Too Big to
Fail Problem, Remarks at the Clearing House's Second Annual Business Meeting and Con-
ference, New York City (Nov. 15, 2012), available at
http://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/speeches/2012/dud 12111 5.html.
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enough capital if left to their own devices.46
The degree of confusion and disinformation around capital and
equity in banking is extraordinary and that's why this book by Anat
Admati and Martin Hellwig is the most important book of the year, the
most important book we have had for many years.47 I hope that all of
you read it, and I hope all of you teach it. I hope all of you engage in it
with your colleagues, and I hope that you push the bankers to engage
with it, too. They must answer the critique of banking in this book and
so must the Federal Reserve.
The last argument is: at the end of the day we will do the bailout
and we'll save the day. Isn't this what you hear from Treasury and what
Mr. Geithner said in his farewell speeches? The government didn't lose
money on TARP he tells us. 48 Well, I think this is the most problematic
and disingenuous belief of all, and one you hear not so much from the
Federal Reserve. It is more a view that is associated with Mr. Geithner
directly.
The cost of any financial crisis is not primarily in the emergency
provision of capital liquidity by authorities that may or may not be paid
back; the cost of financial crisis is the loss of jobs and the loss of
growth. If we are talking about a housing crisis there are many other
dimensions around the disruption of mortgages and the way that home-
owners were treated. We just experienced the greatest financial crisis
since the 1930s because incentives in the financial system encouraged
people to take excessive risk, to have too little capital, too much lever-
age, and too much debt relative to thin cushions of equity.
If you don't believe me, read the work of Richard Fisher and
Harvey Rosenblum of the Dallas Fed. Richard Fisher and Harvey Ros-
enblum, highly respected on the right of the political spectrum, argue
that allowing the banks to have this distortion of incentives has com-
pletely messed up monetary policy and the ability of monetary policy to
46. Admati et al., The Leverage Ratchet Effect (Rock Ctr. for Corp. Governance at
Stanford Univ., Working Paper No. 146, 2013), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=2304969.
47. ADMATI & -ELLWIG, supra note 33.
Tim Massad, The Response to the Financial Crisis - In Charts, TREASURY NOTES BLOG
(Apr. 13, 2012), http://www.treasury.gov/connect/blog/Pages/financial-crisis-response-in-
charts.aspx ("In addition, the latest available estimates indicate that the financial stability
programs are likely to result in an overall positive financial return for taxpayers in terms of
direct fiscal cost.")49. Richard W. Fisher & Harvey Rosenblum, The Blob That Ate Mone-
tary Policy, WALL ST. J., Sept. 28, 2009, at A23.
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be effective, at least when the economy slows down and when there are
various forms of downside scenario around the financial system. One of
their first pieces was an op-ed in the Wall Street Journal called The
Blob That Ate Monetary Policy talking about the way in which the fail-
ure of those banks in 2007-2008 broke down the standard transmission
mechanism for monetary policy, the way the Fed tries to stabilize the
economy, and resulted in all kinds of additional damage-more jobs
lost, and use of unconventional monetary policy, the consequences of
which we don't fully appreciate. 49 No Federal Reserve officials are con-
fronted by this disaster, the Fed's role in it, and the enormous conse-
quences for macroeconomic stability and for monetary policy. The Fed
explicitly denies they have that responsibility. They have made and
backed away from their other responsibilities. Why doesn't the Fed take
this on? Why don't we hear clear speeches from Ben Bernanke on this
topic? Why won't top Fed officials meet with Anat Admati and discuss
these ideas?
Well, I think you have to go back to the DNA of the Federal Re-
serve System. You have to talk to Peter Conti-Brown, who is at this
conference, and you have to wind the clock back to 1907 when the U.S.
did not have a central bank. You have to follow the debate from 1907 to
1913 when there were two conflicting views about creating a central
bank.50 On the one hand, there were the oligarchs who were associated
with Nelson Aldrich, who was arguably the most powerful Senator of
the time. His daughter married John D. Rockefeller's son. Imagine what
that Facebook page would look like? They said we don't want a central
bank because it will make the government too powerful. We want some
support in crisis-that was the lesson from 1907-but we want that to
be in private hands. On the other side there was Louis Brandeis, there
was the Peugeot Committee in the House that said, wait a minute, this is
bankers using other people's money. There has to be a public, govern-
ment role.
What was created in 1913 was a hybrid-it was a mixture of
public and private. This was not unprecedented. There have been other
central banks in history that have had some of that commingling, but I
49. Richard W. Fisher & Harvey Rosenblum, The Blob That Ate Monetary Policy,
WALL ST. J., Sept. 28, 2009, at A23.
50. ELMUS WICKER, THE GREAT DEBATE ON BANKING REFORM: NELSON ALDRICH AND
THE ORIGINS OF THE FED ch. I (2005), available at
https://ohiostatepress.org/Books/Book%20PDFs/Wicker/20Great.pdf
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would argue that the extent of the private sector sway-and particularly
the Wall Street influence and the role of the New York Fed-this was
something you have never seen anywhere else.
This system failed completely in the 1930s and it was replaced
by something that adjusted the balance a little bit more towards the
Board of Governors and a little bit more towards government authority,
but still it preserved this very powerful voice of Wall Street. Perhaps
you can argue in the immediate post-WWII period that the Fed had
moral suasion over the private sector. There are some instances where
Paul Volcker arguably asserted this moral suasion, for example when
the Hunt brothers corner on the silver market failed and the Fed stepped
in to prevent financial disruption. 5 There was a lot of moral suasion in
that case. In the past twenty years it has turned around. It is all about
capture. It is all about ideas. It is coming from Wall Street. The Wall
Street influence in the New York Fed amounts to having excessive
power within the Federal Reserve System.
Some of the smartest, best voices on what needs financial re-
form come from within the Fed: Richard Fisher, the Dallas Fed head,
and Tom Hoenig who is now Vice Chairman at the FDIC. There are
others: Gary Stern and Ron Feldman of the Minnesota Fed wrote a book
called Too Big To Fail in the early 2000s that foreshadowed many of
these same issues, 52 but the New York Fed won't go there. The New
York Fed will not shift, will not engage, and will not have this conver-
sation. The New York Fed will not come and debate these questions
with you, me, Dennis Kelleher, or Anat Admati, or anyone.
The issue is financial regulation. There will not be legislation in
this cycle, but there is a huge amount up for grabs in terms of imple-
mentation and in the belief system of officials. The thinking of many of-
ficials, including at the Federal Reserve in the run-up to 2007-2008, was
as fundamentally flawed as their thinking was in the 1920s and early
1930s. The question is, do they recognize this? Will they make adjust-
ments? Is this a moment of realignment in their thinking? There have
been many such realignments in their thinking and there will be many
more, I am sure.
52. GARY H. STERN & RON J. FELDMAN, Too BIG To FAIL: THE HAZARDS OF BANK
BAILOUTS (2004).
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In the coming seventy years eventually they are going to apolo-
gize for this. It is not going to do us a lot of good, but it might help our
grandchildren, or it might not. Why won't they move? Because of the
influence of Wall Street and the way that filters through their system
and influences their thinking.
Can they be pushed? Absolutely. Senator Sherrod Brown won
reelection against Wall Street money. Senator Elizabeth Warren won
election against Wall Street money. Senator Brown works with republi-
can Senator David Vitter and republican Senator Chuck Grassley on
some of these issues. You can push your politicians, your social net-
work, the people you know to reevaluate, to read this book, The Bank-
er's New Clothes.53 The Federal Reserve must come out and engage on
the substance. If it continues to hide in its bunkers, if it continues to de-
ny that there is a debate, it is failing us just as profoundly as the people
who ran the Federal Reserve failed the American public in the early
1930s.
53. ADMATI & HELLWIG, supra note 33.
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